Abstract
50
It is easy to imagine, that as a result of these gradients, there would be strong selective pressure 51 to evolve context-dependent dispersal (McPeek and Holt, 1992)-that is, low dispersal rates within 52 the reserve and high dispersal rates outside-or, equivalently, the ability for dispersing individuals 53 to detect and preferentially settle in better patches. Since the potential economic benefits of reserves 54 rely on dispersal of individuals from reserves into fished areas, evolution of dispersal might work 55 against the generation of sustainable rent.
56
In this paper we explore that possibility with the aid of a simple,"two-patch" model (Holt, 1985) .
57
We begin by briefly demonstrating that, in the absence of evolution, reserves can be economically 58 optimal when the two patches are sufficiently different in either their biological or economic prop-59 erties (Sanchirico et al., 2006) . We then ask whether reserves are ever optimal (in the sense of 60 maximizing equilibrium rent) when dispersal evolves.
61
Our analysis of this second problem builds on the work of Law and Grey (1989) and Grey
62
(1993) who were perhaps the first to seriously investigate the interplay between harvest and evo-63 lution, i. e., the inclusion of evolutionary change in the constrained optimization problem of the 64 resource manager. They developed the concept of an evolutionarily stable optimal harvest strat-
dx 2 dt = r 2 x 2 1 − x 2 k 2 + m(1 − ε)x 1 − mεx 2 − q 2 E 2 x 2 .
If the price of fish is p, and the cost per unit of effort in patch i is c i , then the rent generated 85 by harvesting is
At first, we concern ourselves with the case in which a manager is able to control the levels of effort 87 in each of the patches (for example by limiting the number of boat-days available for fishing or by 88 taxing effort) and does so with the objective of maximizing the rent, π, at equilibrium.
89
It is a simple matter to numerically calculate the equilibrium stock sizes from equations (1) and
90
(2) for any combination of E 1 and E 2 . These can be substituted into formula (3) to determine the 91 equilibrium rent. We call the effort levels that maximize the equilibrium rent E * i , the corresponding alternative phenotype can increase under selection. In this section, we find an expression forε and
119
show that it is a "weak form ESS." This ESS is also convergence-stable, making it an evolutionary 120 attractor to which the population will converge in the long run. 
Calculating the ESS

122
To determineε, we begin by considering a population composed of a single "resident" phenotype with dispersal preference ε. The equilibrium stock sizes,x 1 andx 2 , satisfy
We will find it useful to define α i as the per capita growth rate, including fishing mortality, in patch
123
i if it were isolated (i. e., if m = 0). That is,
α i can be thought of as the fitness of an individual in patch i at equilibrium.
125
The phenotype that characterizes the resident population evolves through invasions (and se-126 quential replacement) by rare mutants-alternative phenotypes that appear at low frequencies.
127
Mutants are identical to residents, save for their dispersal preference, which we will denote as ε .
128
A mutant's fate depends on its invasion fitness-its initial growth rate in the resident population.
129
When it first appears, the mutant is rare, and its effect on the resident's population dynamics is 
where
Note that the invasion fitness is a function of both the mutant phenotype and the resident phenotype
135
(because the α's depend upon the equilibrium population sizes of the resident, which, in turn depend 136 on ε).
137
If the invasion fitness (10) that must be satisfied by any ESS is that the selection gradient dλ /dε vanishes when ε = ε =ε.
141
Differentiating the invasion fitness (10) with respect to ε and evaluating at ε = ε =ε gives
Since we have assumed that m is positive, a vanishing selection gradient (11) implies that 143 α 1 = α 2 ; but, adding (5) and (6) we find that
Thus, when the resident population sizes are positive, α 1 = α 2 = 0. That is, when the patch 145 preference is at its ESS value,ε, the per capita growth rates in the two patches (including fishing 146 mortality) are identical and zero.
147
By setting α 1 = α 2 = 0 in equilibrium equations (5) and (6), we see that the only potential
are the corresponding population sizes.
151
Substituting the condition α 1 = α 2 = 0 into (10), we see that the invasion fitness of any mutant 152 is 0 whenever the resident phenotype is given by (13 As we show next, the evolutionarily stable dispersal strategy (13) is also convergence stable-an 158 evolutionary attractor to which a monomorphic population will converge through small, successive 159 mutations (Geritz et al., 1998). We thus expect the settlement preference to evolve to, and remain 160 at,ε.
161
We demonstrate the convergence stability ofε using the second derivatives of the invasion fitness 162 (10). Convergence stability requires that
That is, the sum of these second derivatives, taken with respect to the resident and mutant pheno-164 types, must be negative at the ESSε (Eshel, 1983; Geritz et al., 1998).
165
Because α 1 and α 2 do not depend on the mutant strategy ε , it follows that ∂ 2 λ /∂ε 2 = 0 when 166 α 1 = α 2 . Thus, (13) will be a convergence-stable ESS if ∂ 2 λ /∂ε ∂ε < 0 at ε = ε =ε.
167
To calculate ∂ 2 λ /∂ε∂ε , first differentiate the invasion fitness (10) with respect to ε :
Next, recall that α 1 and α 2 depend on the resident trait ε, and rewrite the equilibrium conditions (5) and (6) as
Note that the equilibrium stock sizesx 1 andx 2 are both functions of ε.
The derivatives dx 1 /dε and dx 2 /dε can be found by differentiating the equilibrium equations (5) and (6) with respect to ε. When evaluated at ε = ε =ε andx i =x i , as given by (14), these derivatives are
After substituting (20) and (21) into (19), we find that
It follows that inequality (15) is satisfied and the ESS settlement preference (13) is a convergence-173 stable strategy.
174
4 The ESOHS and effects of evolution on optimal management
175
In general, the rent that is generated in each patch depends upon the fishing effort in both patches.
176
This is not the case when the patch preference ε is at its ESS valueε, which becomes clear upon 177 substituting the equilibrium stock sizes (14) into the rent (3):
This means that when we maximize rent over E 1 and E 2 , we are maximizing the rent in the patches 179 independently of each other. Thus, a reserve cannot be part of an ESOHS; a patch should never 180 be closed unless it is unprofitable to harvest (i. e., falls in the 'unfished' category). Specifically, the
181
ESOHS is
The resulting stock sizes in each patch at the ESOHS are
The evolutionarily stable settlement preference at optimal harvest,ε * , can be calculated using (13) 184 with stock sizesx i =x * i .
185
Spatial heterogeneity in biological or economic parameters is reflected in the ESOHS (Fig. 3) .
186
When the patches differ in their biological parameters (r or k), the ESOHS effort level in the 187 worse patch is smaller than it would be if the patches were identical and the parameter values to catch that it is no longer worth harvesting in patch 2 at all). 
Management with reserves
Marine reserves may be part of an economically optimal, equilibrium management strategy when 206 dispersal does not evolve; however, as (24) shows, this is not the case when dispersal does evolve.
207
While marine reserves are not part of the ESOHS, they may be desirable for other purposes. It is 208 therefore interesting to know how the establishment of a reserve would impact profits. The impact 209 of a reserve is contingent upon whether the organisms evolve in response to differences in growth 210 or mortality conditions.
211
We placed either patch 1 or patch 2 in reserve and calculated the unconstrained rent-maximizing 212 level of effort in the other patch. We also calculated the effort level when the resulting settlement 213 preference was constrained to be evolutionarily stable. We found that using reserves when the 214 settlement preference ε evolves can produce dramatically lower profits (Fig. 4) . When a patch is 215 placed in reserve, ε evolves to increase the tendency of fish to disperse to that patch (i.e., when 216 patch 1 is in reserve, ε increases relative to its value when both efforts are optimized to the ESS 217 settlement preference). At least for the parameter values we studied, ε varies most with variation 218 in k 2 and varies least with r 2 (Fig. 4, top row) . 
Is the ESOHS economically stable?
220
The ESOHS represents the best equilibrium harvesting strategy under the constraint that the 221 strategy will not produce further evolutionary change. At the ESOHS no mutant phenotypes can 222 invade and displace the resident phenotype. We have assumed that those mutants are rare, so that 223 there will generally be a long time between mutation events. In between such events, however, the 224 ESOHS is suboptimal. More rent could be extracted from the resource if the manager were to set 225 the effort levels at their unconstrained levels (i. e., π[Ê * 1 ,Ê * 2 ;ε * ] ≤ π[E * 1 , E * 2 ;ε * ]), and the manager 226 will be sorely tempted to do so. As a result, we should not expect the ESOHS to be economically 227 stable.
228
As a consequence of fishing at (short-term) optimal levels, rather than according to the ESOHS, larger than that that could be generated by the ESOHS; in some instances, it would be less.
236
We simulated this "reactionary" policy by introducing a mutant phenotype according to a
237
Poisson process with rate constant µ. We drew the mutant phenotype ε from a normal distribution 238 with mean equal to the resident phenotype ε, and standard deviation σ, truncated so that 0 < ε < invades, the efforts in each patch, the population levels, and the profits also fluctuate. In the case 246 illustrated, ε tends to be less than the ESOHS ε value, while the effort and population levels tend 247 to be higher than the ESOHS level in patch 1 (blue lines) and lower in patch 2 (orange lines). The 248 rent derived from the reactionary policy tends to be less than the ESOHS rent for this realization.
249
We simulated this stochastic process for a variety of parameter values to assess the average 250 performance of a reactionary versus ESOHS harvesting policy; we found that the rent generated 251 by the ESOHS always exceeded the average rent generated by reactionary harvesting (Fig. 6, strategy, compared to one that changed unpredictably in response to evolutionary changes.
269
Marine reserves do not play a role in the ESOHS for the two-patch model. This is because 270 evolution of dispersal acts to equalize fitness between the two patches and push population densities 271 to levels that result in no net movement between them. Without this net movement of individuals,
272
or "spillover," from the reserve patch into the fished patch, reserves only reduce economic benefits.
273
The equilibration of fitness across habitats is the sine qua non of the so-called ideal free distribution 
300
While our study suggests that evolution of dispersal may reduce the efficacy of reserves as a rent-301 maximizing strategy, our analysis focused on equilibrium management on very long timescales. As Fig. 2 . In the middle two rows, the solid curves indicate effort or stock size in patch 1; the dashed curves depict the same quantities in patch 2. Note that the abscissa is reversed when it denotes the value of c 2 . This makes those figures consistent with the rest in that patch 2 becomes either biologically or economically "worse" as one moves from right to left along the abscissa. Patch 2 is unfished for parameter values to the left of the vertical, red, dashed line in each plot. 
% rent
Figure 4: Percent of equilibrium rent lost, relative to an optimally managed system with no evolution (in blue) or with evolution (in green). Either patch 1 is in reserve (solid line) or patch 2 is in reserve (dashed line), and effort in the other patch is managed so as to maximize equilibrium rent. Note that when there is no evolution, closing patch 2 may be part of the optimal management strategy (when the dashed blue line is at 100%). Parameters are the same as in Fig. 2 . : Ratio of average rent (top row) and standard deviation in rent (bottom row) of the ESOHS strategy (π * ) compared to "reactionary" harvesting (π * ) in which the manager sets effort so as to maximize rent at the current settlement preference (ε) without regard to evolutionary stability (cf. Fig. 5 ). As in earlier figures, all parameters are equal between patches, except that which is noted on the abscissa. Mutants appear according to a Poisson process at the rate µ = 0.01; their phenotype is drawn from a normal distribution with mean given by the resident phenotype, and standard deviation σ = 0.05 (green stars) or σ = 0.5 (black circles), truncated so that 0 < ε < 1. Averages were calculated over the time interval [0, 100,000].
